Nearly 200 people lost their lives in the serial bomb blasts in Indiaâ€™s financial capital of Mumbai. The number is insignificant in a country of a billion, but deliberate planned massacres have this cruel meaninglessness to them that rile up the hearts of even the stoics.
The immediate Indian response to the blasts has been muted as the government has refused to pin down the attack on Pakistan supported (or at least based) militant groups before corroborating evidence documenting such comes to the fore, against the norm. The response has been markedly different from the theatrical over-the-top response of the BJP led government, which deployed troops at the border after the attack on the Indian parliament.
The muted response comes amidst strong pressure on Indian government to take â€™strong measuresâ€™. While a casual observer may take this to be a sign of pussyfooting, there is a pragmatic rationale behind toning down the response – the elbow room that India has when it comes to Pakistan is very limited given that outright conventional war is not an option and that hostile rhetoric will only play into the hands of right-wing elements in Pakistan. The argument in more abstract terms can be understood as follows â€“ Negotiation without leverage is a failed enterprise; and any efforts to create leverage through hostile rhetoric are likely to backfire.
Pakistan governmentâ€™s negotiating stance is likely to be governed by the fact that working with India to dismantle terrorist infrastructure is likely to be reasonably costly, given it is likely to be destabilizing in the short term, and politically costly given efforts are going to seen as towing the line of India. For Indian government, incentives to use this â€œopportunityâ€ to address some of the issues at the root of the conflict â€“ if not terrorist attacks â€“ is likely to be non-existent given the following – any latent or explicit demands made by people conducting terrorist attacks are automatically seen as lacking legitimacy, sources and explanations of terrorism are seen to be external, and any attempt to deal with demands of terrorists is likely to provoke a backlash.
What is clear is that problem understood thus is likely to thwart dealing with issues that are likely to be rewarding in the longer-term. Both Pakistan and India would clearly benefit from not hiding behind temporary exigencies, and dealing with problems head on. In the long term Pakistan would benefit from tackling the terrorist infrastructure, though it may lose some leverage in Kashmir, which is probably fine. Similarly, India would likely gain by addressing Kashmir which will likely strengthen the hands of moderates in Pakistan. Political entrepreneurship can do much to reframe the problem. After all, considerable entrepreneurship (pandering) is behind the current understanding of the problem as a zero-sum game.